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Abstract 
As an example of the context-relatedness of Barth’s  work, this 
article compares his crisis theology with Heidegger ’s philosophy of 
Being. Further examples are Barth’s reaction to the  modernism of 
his time, with its accent on rationalism (see his c ritique of Kant), and 
the influence of subjective theology. In spite of h is condemnation of 
natural theology, Barth could make a unique contrib ution to the 
current science-theology debate. His reading of the  creation story 
and the way he views (transcends) the literal text in order to 
experience the Word of God as an event through that  text, is a case 
in point. This approach, too, is comparable with ce rtain aspects of 
Heidegger’s work. Barth’s reaction to the natural t heology of his day 
was equally tied to that context. His particular ta rget was the 
theology of that era which he interpreted as “natur al theology”. To 
Barth, natural theology is metaphor for self-assert ive, autonomous 
human beings who, via reason, manipulate the church , the Word 
and tradition.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION: BARTH IN PRESENT-DAY SOUTH 
AFRICA? 
Concepts of God and nature are dynamically variable. This demands ongoing 
reconsideration of them. Cosmology and natural theology have been part of 
human thinking since it was first recorded, and experienced a golden age in 
ancient Greece. The aim of this article is not to propose a new natural 
theology; nor does it seek to resurrect older models. It is necessary, however, 
to examine the extent to which nature actually does play a role in people’s 
faith, to take note of developments in the natural sciences which put the idea 
of natural theology in a whole new context, to investigate the place of natural 
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theology in the dynamic science-religion debate and to make room for 
meaningful interaction between nature and faith. Barth is examined from this 
perspective, as he represents a radical rejection of natural theology and 
proposes instead a theology exclusively based on revelation.  
In studies like this one the South African context is relevant, as Barth is 
to this day highly regarded in South African Reformed theology; two South 
Africans (the theologian Wentzel van Huyssteen and the physicist George 
Ellis) are prominent in the global science-religion debate; and more 
particularly because the debate on the relations of God and nature, and of 
natural science and religion, has not yet taken off in South Africa, being 
limited to a few interested individuals.  
 
2. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY NATURAL THEOLOGY? 
Natural theology was traditionally seen as a means of obtaining knowledge 
about God from nature (physical and human nature), applying the light of 
human reason to reach knowledge about God’s nature and works insofar as 
they are revealed in physical and human nature. Linked to this are the “proofs” 
of God’s existence, as identified by Aquinas and many others after him.  
In the context of Barth’s thought, however, the definition must be 
extrapolated to the concept of autonomous human reason, which includes all 
human endeavours to make sense of human existence outside the realm of 
revelation. It therefore includes all sciences (including theology) which seek 
truth outside the revelation of Jesus Christ. This means that all human 
reasoning activities outside divine revelation constitute natural theology. Barth 
sees natural theology as an expression of human self-awareness and self-
confirmation (Selbstbewahrung und Selbstbehauptung) before God. 
Wissink (1983:7) adds the following relationships to the problem area 
of natural theology: theology – philosophy; nature – grace; Christianity – other 
religions; Catholicism – Reformation; and others. Terms which surface in the 
debate range from intolerance, Pelagianism, heathendom, metaphysics and 
scholasticism to culture, orthodoxy, missionary work, rationality, hermeneutics 
and certainty. This is no exaggeration, as for practical purposes one must take 
into account the whole of Barth’s theology in order to understand his 
dismissive attitude towards natural theology. 
Natural theology was a minor issue in the Reformation. That the 
heavens declared the glory of God was not questioned until the modern 
period, when the interest shifted from nature versus grace, and from works 
versus faith, to reason versus faith and natural religion versus revelation 
(Wisnefske 1990:55). The problem flared up again at the beginning of the 
scientific revolution in the 16th century, when Kepler and Galileo declared the 
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independence of science as the “book of nature”, as against religion’s “book of 
revelation”. This was the start of human rationality’s declaration of 
independence, which became typical of all natural theology.1 Cupitt 
(1997:112) refers to the Enlightenment’s simplified version of the world: 
“There was rational theology, which consisted of a body of universal truths … 
and there was revealed theology, which consisted of a body of propositions 
that were ‘above reason’ and were to be believed on authority of faith.”  
In our day the debate on the distinction between natural, supernatural 
and scientific explanations of the origins of the cosmos and of life on earth is 
still raging.2 There was no such debate in Barth’s time, or rather, it was still in 
its infancy. Then, nature was not an object of deliberate theological reflection. 
Hummel (1994:156) points out that, following Schleiermacher, theology has 
become a theology of the historical revelation in strict opposition to natural 
theology: “Seitdem hat es im deutschen Protestantismus keine natürliche 
Theologie im klassischen Sinn mehr gegeben …. Die ‘natürlichen Theologie’ 
wurde zu einer Art Ketzername, und damit verschwand auch die Natur als 
Gegenstand theologischer Reflexion.”  
Barth launched the natural theology debate by characterising the 
theology and thought of his time as natural theology.3 Undeniably the 
contextual circumstance of the rise of Nazism contributed to his opinion. 
Hauerwas (2001:168) sees Barth’s Church dogmatics “... as the attempt to 
develop a theological metaphysics and ethics that witness to the God who is 
                                                     
1 The human-nature dichotomy leads to dualism. “This artificial separation of man from nature 
(giving man a categorical spiritual dimension) which is alien to many Christians is an 
important reason why some scientists have disowned the Christian cosmological view” (Miller 
1995:140). 
 
2 Natural theology seems to be part of our natural life, an attempt to make sense of our 
natural existence. It persists in our time in spite of being discounted by theologians. “Simple 
involvement in natural life seems to lead people to an unsophisticated assertion that there is a 
God” (Wisnefske 1990:93).  
 
3 The best-known example was Barth’s confrontation with Brunner (his “No!”) in 1934. 
Brunner, in a paper Nature and Grace. A contribution to the discussion with Karl Barth, took 
up his position as an admirer of Barth, but listed six points in which he thought Barth 
overstated his case. We simply name these points without discussing them, as they are 
mentioned by Brown (1967:79-84): 1 Image of God: Barth argues that the image of God in 
humans has been completely destroyed by sin. Brunner says humans are still human – 
starting point for natural theology. 2 General revelation: Barth exalts revelation in Christ at the 
expense of revelation in nature. 3 Preserving grace: Saving grace, emphasised at the 
expense of grace at work in the creation and preservation of the universe. Brunner 
emphasises God’s gracious preservation, which he considers a starting point for natural 
theology (see Calvin’s idea of the preservation of the elect). 4. The divine ordinances: Barth’s 
denial that we can see the hand of God in certain divine ordinances. A divine ordinance of 
preservation must be seen as a lex naturae, and therefore as pagan. 5 Point of contact 
(Anknüpfungspunkt): The grace of Christ has no point of contact in humans. 6 Whether grace 
abolishes or perfects nature (gratia non tollit naturam sed perfcit): Over-exalting grace at the 
expense of nature. 
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the beginning and end of all that is”. Many people perceived this as imperialist 
and totalitarian. “Yet without such a theology, the church would have been 
even more devoid of resources in its confrontation with Hitler” (Hauerwas 
2001:169). This is not a very convincing reason (Bonhoeffer felt no need for it, 
and found his answer in precisely the opposite direction: living in the world 
radically and responsibly, sicut Deus non daretur), and if it really was the 
case, it was not very effective and certainly not a helpful approach to today’s 
world. In my opinion the chief emphasis of Barth’s reaction against natural 
theology should be seen as the personal threat that modernism,4 science and 
the somewhat independent development of theological sciences posed to 
Barth.  
Apart from his debate with Brunner, Barth focused mainly on Christian 
natural theology and hardly at all on the question of natural theology in the 
sciences. In The readiness of man he attacked Christian natural theology (CD 
II/1:135). It amounts to a sermon of conversion, in which a sinful person (in 
this case, a theologian) is confronted with the fact that he cannot save himself 
(is not prepared to subject himself to God’s judgment and mercy): “It involves 
self-denial to deny the basic idea in all natural theology ... It involves self-
abnegation. And how is this possible? How can man jump over his own 
shadow? ... What else is the God whom he affirms he knows immediately ... 
but his own reflection, the hypostasising of his self-consciousness ...?” 
(II/1:136). Theology, or natural theology, appears to accept revelation and 
grace, and gives them precedence materially and formally, but behind the 
humility lurks a monopolising of the Word. “To be sure, the disguise of its 
position of monopoly is a distinctive feature of natural theology in the Church 
(even in Catholicism) ...” (CD II/1:137-138). Although the believer was thrown 
off balance for a moment by the Word which questioned him, “he has now 
absorbed and domesticated revelation itself” (CD II/1:139). Barth’s criticism is 
radical – no competition can be countenanced: “If grace is alongside nature ... 
it is obviously no longer the grace of God ... If God’s revelation is alongside a 
knowledge of God proper to man as such, even though it may never be 
                                                     
4 Modernism represents the impossible possibility that we can engage in “God-talk” without 
knowing God, do theology without believing in God and preach the gospel without having 
encountered God. This was the reason for Barth’s concern. Humans became knowing 
Subjects, submitting everything to their investigating, scrutinising and defining reason. God 
cannot become a study object – he is the unknowable subject confronting humans. Barth 
states (CD II/1:21): “As knowledge of faith the knowledge of God is just like any other 
knowledge in that it also has an object. We have seen that thereby the primary objectivity of 
God is to be distinguished – but not separated – from the secondary. But as knowledge of 
faith the knowledge of God is unlike any other knowledge in that its object is the living Lord of 
the knowing man: his Creator, from whom he comes before he knows him … . But this means 
that knowledge of this object can in no case and in no sense mean that we have this object at 
our disposal. Certainly we have God as object, but in not in the same way as we have other 
objects.” 
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advanced except as a prolegomenon, it is obviously no longer the revelation 
of God, but a new expression ... for the revelation which encounters man in 
his own reflection” (CD II/1:139). Although Barth himself made use of the work 
done by colleagues and established a respectable theology, that does not 
gainsay this judgment:  
 
The triumph of natural theology in the Church, described as the 
absorbing and domestication of revelation, is very clearly the 
process of making the Gospel respectable. ... What is all open 
unbelief, and how hopeful it seems, compared with a “victory of 
faith” in which man has already conquered faith by being a believer 
along with all the other things he is, by making even the Gospel into 
a means of his self-preservation and self-defence! We can make 
only a brief reference to the abundance of religious, moral, political, 




Barth says that natural theology usually starts from nature, “... from the nature 
which he has not lost even as a Christian, but which he still puts into effect as 
a Christian in a way which is particularly triumphant and formally conclusive; 
that is to say, by domesticating the Gospel, which is to make it innocuous ... . 
It is in its naturalness, i.e. respectability, that it has its indestructible glory” (CD 
II/1:142).  
 
3. BARTH’S POSITION ON NATURAL THEOLOGY AS THE 
NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF HIS THEOLOGICAL 
MODEL 
While Heidegger criticised natural theology on the basis of the nature of 
Being5 and philosophical insights, Barth criticised it from the position of the 
theology.6 His crisis theology developed into a theological model intended to 
immunise God, revelation and theology against any rational criticism or 
scientific investigation. There is almost no aspect of Barth’s theology that does 
not impact, directly or indirectly, on his opinion of natural theology. We cite 
only a few examples.  
                                                     
5 This is not the place to go into Barth’s distinction between analogia entis and analogia fidei. 
He describes analogia entis (natural theology) as follows: “… you acknowledge an analogy 
between God and man, and therefore one point at which God can be known even apart from 
His revelation. That is to say, you acknowledge the analogy of being, analogia entis, the idea 
of being in which God and man are always comprehended together” (CD II/1:81). 
 
6 Chung (2005:66) has shown that, like Heidegger, Barth also rejects an unlimited mastery of 
human technology over the earth. Providence, which means co-existence for Barth is in fact 
his theological actualization of analogia relationis.   
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Barth’s theological model is so effective that it could be said to have 
colonised the theological world. After Barth, it was practically impossible to 
work outside his model without opening oneself up to his criticism. Just as the 
criticism of metaphysics in philosophy brought an end, de iure, to philosophy, 
so Barth’s ideas brought an end to theologising as an independent discipline. 
Gauchet (1997:34), for example, responds as follows to the idea of God as 
the Ganz Andere (Wholly Other), which removes God as an object of modern 
thought because people cannot know God but can only be known by God the 
Subject: “The more God is thought of and venerated as the Wholly Other, the 
less his creatures’ existence is perceived and treated by them as being 
controlled by something other ... Emphasising divine difference proves to go 
hand-in-hand with broadening the power humans have over themselves and 
the order they comply with.” Barth has been accused of deism and dualism 
because of his emphasis on the Ganz Andere. In the words of Torrance 
(1970:122): 
 
The achievement of this distance or separation of the divine from 
the human led Barth to conceive the relation between grace and 
nature, revelation and religion, in such a dialectic and diacritical 
way, that he could be trapped into speaking of God as everything 
and of man as nothing, which appeared to cast such a slur upon the 
creation that he was accused of Marcionism as well as deism. 
 
Torrance (1970:122) ascribes this to the Lutheran and Augustinian dualism in 
which Barth’s theology is rooted. Barth did indeed try to break free from this 
dualism by establishing a “positivistic theism”, to such an extent that 
Blumhardt speaks of an “astounding and unheard of objectivity in the matters 
of God” (cited in Torrance 1970:123). 
With reference to the way Barth deduces theology from revelation, 
McGrath (2003:140) says: “There is an inherent circularity within the dogmatic 
method, in that it ultimately rests upon a “self-positing and self-authenticating 
Word of God”, which explains but is not explicable, and which authenticates 
without being authenticated.” For that reason Barth’s theology is classed as 
revelatory positivism and Christ-centred monism which, if taken literally, must 
of necessity isolate theology from the world and all other disciplines. 
Barth remains within the framework of scientific rhetoric when he 
explains that, like any other scientist, he is led by his field of investigation. If 
theology’s field of investigation is – exclusively – God, and if positive 
knowledge of God is obtained from the way God makes himself known, then it 
is impossible to use another field of enquiry (nature) as a clue to 
understanding God. Barth therefore makes much of the epistemological 
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implications of the doctrine of sola gratia. Scientific objectivity and theological 
truth converge in the doctrine of justification (Torrance 1970:127-128).  
In CD IV/3 the first half, Barth proposes indicates the positive aspects 
of nature: “To the faithfulness of the Creator, … there corresponds the 
persistence and constancy of the creature.” CD IV/3 the first half); and further: 
“… nature … has its also as such its own lights and truths and therefore its 
own speech and words.” CD IV/3 the first half, 139). This testimony from 
nature is independent from human recognition, and not extinguished by 
human corruption. Nature remains the theatrum gloriae Dei (CD IV/3 the first 
half, 140). The light of nature points to the laws we detect in nature (CD IV/3 
the first half, 142) and Barth then continue to give some characteristics of the 
light of nature (CD IV/3 the first half, 143ff). 
 
4. BARTH’S STANCE ON NATURAL THEOLOGY IN VIEW 
OF THE INFLUENCE OF KANT AND HEIDEGGER 
 
4.1 Kant’s opinion on the (im)possibility of knowin g God 
To understand Karl Barth’s radical rejection of natural theology, we must 
consider his particular circumstances and contemporaries.7 We confine 
ourselves to Kant and Heidegger.  
In Kant’s thinking, God is not an object of knowledge open to human 
investigation. His reasoning is, of course, different than that of Barth, as Kant 
does not deem God to be empirically accessible to the senses and therefore 
knowable. God’s sole significance is to further our understanding of nature or 
as a postulate in moral thought. As Wisnefske (1990:51) says: “For much of 
theology after Kant, ‘God’ is defined by the function it served in 
consciousness: it is whatever makes possible a feeling of absolute 
dependence; it is whatever conditions authentic existence. Whatever fills a 
certain function in human experience, or conditions certain activity, is ‘God.’” 
The notion of reason as the only reliable source of knowledge was 
increasingly to come under fire. Torrance (2004:211) says: “Until the 
emergence of Kant’s Critique of pure reason it was reason that depicted man 
as the image of God. Kant challenged the capacity of reason to deliver 
knowledge of God and substituted reason with the ethical, the sphere of moral 
will as home of religion”. 
 
                                                     
7 Barth’s theological endeavours cannot be understood in isolation from the assault they 
triggered on 19th century theology, although the conflict was not defined until 1929-1930 (see 
McGrath 2001:268). 
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Wisnefske (1990:51) indicates that after Kant God could no longer be 
an object of direct human knowledge, but only “an idea of ours, useful for our 
understanding of nature, or a postulate of our moral activity. God therefore 
served human endeavor”. Kant (2002:46) says: 
 
Thus the worth of all objects to be acquired through our action is 
always conditioned. The beings whose existence rests not on our 
will but on nature nevertheless have, if they are beings without 
reason, only a relative worth as means, and are called things; 
rational beings, by contrast, are called persons, because their 
nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e., as 
something that may not be used merely as means … . 
 
If Kant speaks out against the objectification of the other for our own benefit, 
this would apply even more to the objectification of God. God, however, is an 
object not of empirical knowledge but of religious knowledge. Similarly, Rorty 
(1980:382; see also 383ff) says that what is laudable about Kant is not his 
“epistemological” distinction between the transcendental and the empirical 
standpoints, but rather his “existentialist” distinction between people as 
empirical selves and as moral agents.  
Barth had to separate the Christian God from the God of philosophers 
or the God of experience and thought. The only way to do this was to refuse 
to acknowledge God as an object of human thought, experience or 
investigation.8 God cannot be known without his revelatory initiative, neither 
can he be experienced outside it. If God in his mercy makes himself an object 
of knowledge in Jesus Christ, then and then only can he be known. Barth 
(1973:275) Summarised Kant’s view in his Protestant theology in the 
nineteenth century: “So far as the objects of intuition and the understanding, 
of empirical knowledge, are concerned, God, Freedom and Immortality are not 
objects of our knowledge. That means: they are not objects of our theoretical 
knowledge. They are not to be comprehended simply as existent reality. 
Metaphysics – metaphysical cosmology, psychology and theology – is 
impossible, if one understands by it a theoretical knowledge of objects, the 
concepts of which must be devoid corresponding intuitions.” Barth (1973:273) 
understood the implications for theology: “From now on theology would no 
longer be able to formulate its tenets, no matter on what foundation it might 
base them, without having acquired a clear conception of the method of 
reason, which it also uses in the construction of its tenets.” 
                                                     
8 This, of course, is not how human thought works. We do not think about God only when his 
word addresses us. In our naive experiential world, we experience God differently.   
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Interestingly, Barth’s criticism of natural theology is in fact more like 
criticism of rationalism and epistemology, and has little to do with nature or 
with knowledge of God. In Barth’s terms it would be disastrous for theology if 
discourse about God was made possible and determined by human abilities. 
That would be to confirm Feuerbach’s theory of God as a human projection. 
Barth assumes that any natural theology necessarily tries to choke out 
Christian theology otherwise it is not natural theology (Wisnefske 1990:53, 
54). This, however, is simply a caricature of natural theology and all human 
culture.  
Don Cupitt (1997:58) reminds us that much of our “absolute 
presuppositions” (our Platonic legacy) surfaced between Descartes and 
Derrida. Kant tried to show that some could be proved, but only by giving up 
the old metaphysics of God: “Instead of being objective truths propping up an 
objective God, Kant made them into just structural presuppositions and 
postulates of our knowledge and our moral action.” Cupitt (1997:81) proposes 
a “non-realistic” view of God which asks us to give up the old “objective” 
doctrine of God, and instead regard talk about belief in God as a guideline for 
the way we see ourselves and shape our lives. 
Some of the consequences of Kant’s philosophy are that many people 
dropped a rationalist objectification of God, and moved the Platz Gottes from 
reason to experience and human emotion. Post-Kant, much theological writing 
has defined “God” in terms of his function in human consciousness: God is 
whatever makes possible a feeling of absolute dependence; God is whatever 
conditions authentic existence. This makes it impossible to distinguish God’s 
activity from a process of consciousness, and consequently modern theology 
is an easy target for Feuerbach’s charge that God is a projection of human 
feelings. Barth’s reaction to Schleiermacher and existentialism was a result of 
his rejection of any attempt to view consciousness or feeling as a locus for 
knowledge about God. 
 
4.2 Barth’s view of natural theology and Heidegger’ s ontology 
To understand Barth’s implacable opposition to natural theology it is helpful to 
consider a contemporary philosopher like Heidegger, who shares Barth’s 
attitude to natural theology from a philosophical position.9 In the 1920s both 
Barth and Heidegger reacted to the postwar crisis of European culture. Barth 
focused on the evangelical Christian community, turning the religious rhetoric 
of the time on its head, while Heidegger’s ontological rhetoric on the meaning 
of being was aimed at the existentialist community. Both were responding to 
                                                     
9 Other thinkers like Nietzsche and the theologian Kierkegaard, not discussed here, followed 
the same approach. For a discussion of Kierkegaard’s position, see Connell (1999:159-164). 
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the spiritual crisis which followed the First World War: “Each of them invites 
the reader to understand the crisis metaphorically. Barth figured the human 
situation as the crisis of human sinfulness before God. Heidegger understood 
the situation as the crisis of inauthentic being in the world” (Klemm 1987:447). 
Eighteenth-century optimism in the afterglow of the Enlightenment had 
disappeared, and Barth silenced investigative reason by denying that God 
could be an object of thought. Theology as positive knowledge of God was 
impossible. The only knowledge of God came from God himself when He, 
freely and mercifully, broke into human reality – and this was not available to 
humans: “If this ‘breaking in’ does not occur, our thought remains merely 
empty, formal, critical and unproductive, incapable of mastering the rich world 
of appearance and of apprehending each particular thing in the context of the 
whole” (Barth 1972:48). In the words of Klemm (1987:448), “Theology thus 
receives a negative knowledge of God: theology knows God as wholly other 
than reason or unreason, language or silence, subjectivity or objectivity, and 
wholly other than the mediation of any of these.” Logically, then, natural 
theology is situated within human reason; it strives to move from bottom to top 
(a bottom-up approach), and in Barth’s opinion it is just as taboo as any other 
attempt to know God by rational means.10 
Heidegger highlights the crisis metaphor in the inauthentic 
(uneigentliche) life (Dasein). Humankind has been subjected to the fallen state 
(Verfallenheit) of Dasein. Dasein includes guilt and death: “Die Sorge birgt 
Tod und Schuld gleichursprünglich in sich” (Heidegger 1976:306). Human 
Dasein is characterised by truth (being) and untruth (concealment), and 
people have no control over the appearance of being in the mode of 
enlightening truth any more than they have, in Barth’s opinion, control over 
God.11 God, the Ganz Andere, breaks into human existence freely and 
mercifully; likewise, for Heidegger truth breaks into human Dasein. 
Conscience identifies authentic Dasein, and is rooted in its openness: “Das 
                                                     
10 The distinction between the “from below” and “from above” approaches is relative and 
reductive. Nothing comes entirely from either “below” or “above”. The metaphysical 
presuppositions in any natural theology, the a priori presuppositions in scientific models, the 
value systems in “the neutral, value-free practice of science” have all been debunked 
repeatedly. Barth’s theology is not exclusively “from above”. Any theology is embodied in the 
language, imagery and context of its time. Barth’s rejection of the idea that God finds a 
human point of contact is a metaphysical statement in the service of his ideal: to disallow on a 
human level any possibility of knowing God. We use this distinction with the stated 
reservation in mind. 
 
11 “Die existenzial-ontologische Bedingung dafür, dass das In-der-Welt-sein durch >>Wahrheit 
<< und >>Unwahrheit<< bestimmt ist, leigt in der Seinsverfassung des Daseins, die wir als 
den geworfen Entwurf kennzeigneten. Sie ist ein Konstitutivum der Sorge” (Heidegger 
1976:223). 
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Verstehen des Gewissensrufes enthüllt die Verlorenheit in das Man. Die 
Entschlossenheit holt das Dasein auf sein eigenstes Selbstseinkönnen 
zurück. Eigentlich und ganz durchsichtig wird das eigene Seinkönnen im 
verstehenden Sein zum Tode als der eigensten Möglichkeit” (Heidegger 
1976:307). 
As we have seen, Heidegger shared Barth’s negative feelings about 
natural theology. Natural theology is concerned with ontologically causal, 
technological thinking, which is diametrically opposed to the nature of faith 
and being. It destroys what it seeks to prove. Connell (1999:152-156) 
identifies five objections which Heidegger has to natural theology. Firstly, 
theistic arguments are useless to express humans’ relationship with God and 
to interpret it theologically. The fact that theology is rooted in faith makes 
natural theology impossible. Faith excludes any natural theological proofs. 
Secondly, theistic arguments are hypocritical in that believers claim to be 
questioning God’s existence, whereas they actually accept it as true. For the 
same reason, believers are incapable of posing genuinely philosophical 
questions like “why is there something, and not nothing?” To believers, 
philosophy is nonsense! Thirdly, theistic arguments provide ontological 
reasons for ontological questions. The being of entities is not itself an entity. 
“To try to answer ontological questions – questions of why what-is is and why 
it is meaningful – in terms of a particular entity, even when that entity is God, 
is worse than useless” (Connell 1999:154). Fourthly, theistic arguments are 
causal, deducing the existence of God as the cause of specific observed 
effects. Their causal nature helps to obscure being. “What is more, the very 
god they infer is part and parcel of this desolate condition” (Connell 
1999:154). Finally, the God whose existence is deduced by means of theistic 
arguments is a false god. Interestingly, Heidegger does not think that 
ontological causal thinking is necessarily flawed – only that it leads to the god 
of metaphysics instead of to the true God. The god causa sui is the god of 





                                                     
12 Heidegger’s positive response to Nietzsche’s verdict that God is dead should be seen in 
this context: “The pronouncement ‘God is dead’ means: The suprasensory world is without 
effective power. It bestows no life. Metaphysics, ie, for Nietzsche Western philosophy 
understood as Platonism, is at an end. Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as the 
countermovement to metaphysics, and that means for him a movement in opposition to 
Platonism” (Heidegger 1977:61).  
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5. BARTH’S VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THEOLOGY AS 
A SCIENCE AND THE PLACE OF NON-THEOLOGICAL 
SCIENCES 
Barth’s negative attitude to the role of the natural sciences in theology is 
important, because people today view nature through the lens of natural 
science. Barth wanted at all costs to preserve theology’s independence from 
all other sciences and from any kind of natural theology.13  
Barth set theology as a science apart from the other sciences. “If 
theology allows itself to be a science, it cannot at the same time take over the 
obligation to submit to measurement by the canons valid for other sciences.” 
Theology could not set its own standards for science (which included good 
theology). “To put itself in a systematic relationship with the other sciences, 
theology would have to regard its own special existence as fundamentally 
necessary. That is exactly what it cannot do. It absolutely cannot regard itself 
as a member of an ordered cosmos, but only as a stop-gap in an unordered 
one” (CD I/1:9). Barth saw the consequence of any attempt to establish 
theology as a science as “... in fact destructive, (the) surrender of theology to 
the general concept of science ...” (CD I/1:9). He goes on to say that theology 
can only be a science if it spells out precisely what it understands as “scientific 
nature”. His scorn of the sciences is evident in these words: “No science 
possesses manorial rights to the name of ‘science’, nor is there any theory of 
science with final authority to give or to withhold this title” (CD I/1:10).  
Barth grants scientific status to theology, because in that way theology 
as a human attempt (a “bottom-up” one – CWdT) to find truth will have 
solidarity with other sciences in their own search for the good (note the 
humility intrinsic to scientific endeavour). Theology does not intend to leave 
the concept of science to the other sciences, and for that reason Barth objects 
to what he calls the “‘heathen’ general concept of science”. This means that 
the sciences are human constructs of reality, whereas theology cannot design 
a construct of God to suit itself. Theology as a science is therefore a fait 
accompli, because God has revealed himself to humankind. In the words of 
McGrath (2003:139): “For the early Barth, one of the most dangerous threats 
faced by the church was the subversion of its own identity through the 
                                                     
13 Barth intends a fortiori to exclude theology from science. Like other sciences, aetiology 
must be guided by its object of study. In order to explain what he means by science, he 
quotes Heinrich Scholtz’s six postulates: (1) the proposition postulate (freedom from 
contradiction); (2) the coherence postulate (unity in the objective realm); (3) the controllability 
postulate (all propositions must be testable); (4) the congruity postulate (concerning that 
which is physically and biologically impossible); (5) the independence postulate (freedom from 
all prejudice); (6) it must be possible to break all propositions down into axioms and theorems, 
and test them on that basis (CD I/1:7-8). Barth rejects the last five, and only accepts the first 
on certain conditions. For a discussion of this, see Clark (1963:52-75).  
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intrusion of ‘religion’ as a human construction, leading to the dislodging of the 
gospel itself.” This implies that theology as a human construct is the same as 
natural theology. Nevertheless, Barth does not consider the heathenish 
appearance of the sciences so serious that theology has to dissociate itself 
from them – rather, he proposes that the sciences should be brought under 
the church’s umbrella! (This is not to say that he supported the development 
of something like a Christian science – CD I/1:10-11. See also Clark 1963:71-
74.) We could just as readily understand that any natural theology should also 
be brought under the church’s umbrella, as all the disciplines, including 
theology, form part of the created realm, and can only arrive at truth through 
God’s gracious gift of faith. 
 
6. THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWING GOD  
Barth relativises any capacity for human knowledge, methodology or 
language-based knowledge when it comes to knowledge of God. In this 
regard, language, rationality, science, theology, philosophy or any other 
human capability have as little chance of acquiring knowledge of God as does 
natural theology. It would be wrong, therefore, to single out natural theology 
as the one and only way by which God cannot be known. God cannot be 
known by means of any theology, human piety, rational intelligence, science 
or methodology. The only way to know God is through faith, as a hidden God. 
Paradoxically, there is a difference between knowledge of a hidden God and 
the impossibility of knowing the (hidden) God. God’s hidden nature is 
qualified: 
 
... nothing can be more misleading than the opinion that the 
theological statement of the hiddenness of God says roughly the 
same thing as the Platonic or Kantian statement, according to 
which the supreme being is to be understood as a rational idea 
withdrawn from all perception and understanding ... . For on this 
view God is understood as a rational idea, which, however 
transcendent, is general, “pure” and non-objective. 
 
(CD II/1, 183) 
 
At the beginning of this volume he puts it like this: “We cannot equally well ask 
about the knowledge of the World-Ground or the World-Soul, the Supreme 
Good or Supreme Value, the Thing in itself or the Absolute, Destiny or Being 
or Idea, or even the First Cause as the Unity of Being and Idea, as we can ask 
about knowledge of Him who in the Bible is called God and Lord” (CD II/1:6).  
God can only be known via the faith which He Himself gave to humans 
through revelation, a faith characterised by judgment and mercy. God gives 
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this faith only by way of revelation. The question is whether faith as a human 
capability (or starting point for divine revelation) is not also a God-given 
capacity of human beings (the human creation)14 analogous to reason, 
science, language15 and emotion?16 The answer will be that faith – as a 
human capacity, like language, reason and emotion – must be distinguished 
from faith instilled by God (since heathens or believers in non-Christian 
religions also have faith).17 Thus Barth sees God-given faith as a separate 
metaphysical gift to humankind, to be understood metaphorically as the 
process which takes place in the case of the elect,18 who receive a new life in 
Christ “from above” through the proclamation of the revealed word. But faith is 
not an independent human ability or capacity. What is more, “to speak of Him 
in our human words, this in no sense means that our human viewing, 
conceiving and speaking possess their own capacity for God – even a 
capacity awakened and actualised by revelation and faith” (CD II/1:194). What 
we say about God, whatever images we use, cannot be true if God does not 
make it true. “It is settled that as such our images of perception, thought and 
words neither are nor can be images of God. They become this. They become 
truth. But they do not do so of themselves; they do it wholly and utterly from 
their object. Therefore the hiddenness of God remains” (CD II/1:194).  
We cannot give God a name (CD III/1:187); we cannot even know him 
as the eternal one. “We must not, therefore, base the hiddenness of God on 
the inapprehensibility of the infinite, the absolute, that which exists in and of 
itself, etc. For all this ... is the product of human reason.” Hence any use of or 
reference to God outside the context of faith is meaningless. “If we incorporate 
Him into any of our worldviews, it may help us to complete this worldview; but 
                                                     
14 “The fact that we are created in the likeness of God means that God has determined us to 
bear witness to His existence in our existence. But it does not mean that we possess and 
discover an attribute within ourselves on the basis of which we are on a level with God” (CD 
II/1, 188). 
 
15 “The sufficiency of our thought-form, and of the perception presupposed in it, and of the 
word-form based on it, collapses altogether in relation to this God” (CD II/1:190). 
 
16 “And again, it would be a misunderstanding of the Deus definiri nequit if theology and 
proclamation tried to renounce the viewing and conceiving of God Himself in order to become 
a theology and proclamation of the subjective feelings and experiences of the pious man or a 
theology and proclamation of the underlying feeling of ‘absolute dependence’” (CD II/1:193).  
 
17 Faith as a leap in the dark or sacrificium intellectus is similarly a human strategy. “The 
sacrificium intellectus as the last despairing, audacious act of self-confidence, in which man 
thinks he can decide upon his very knowledge of God, has turned out to be a bit of conjuring 
.... Even interpreted as a leap into faith, it does not create a position which cannot be attacked 
and is not attacked” (CD II/1:9). It would be the same as, for instance, a religious philosophy 
of authority. 
 
18 “The revelation of God is that God has given to the creature whom He has chosen and 
determined for this end …” (CD II/1:199). 
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at the same time it will reveal its godlessness ... We are not master of God, 
and for this reason we cannot apprehend Him of ourselves” (CD II/1:189).  
Revelation and faith are miracles by means of which we can 
understand the incomprehensible (CD II/1:197). The gift of faith should be 
understood metaphorically, as the following point illustrates: although Paul 
battled to establish the idea that we can only be saved by faith in Jesus Christ 
(by the gospel, not the law), and although Luther had to rediscover this truth 
and confirm it in the context of the Catholic theology of his time, in Barth’s 
time this idea was self-evident in Reformed circles. Nevertheless modernism 
and, in theology historical, editorial and textual criticism, have made faith 
something of a human propensity.19 Barth radicalises faith afresh by seeing it 
as a gift “from above”, and strips all human thought, language, rationality, 
science, natural theology and so on, from the capacity to know God. Just as, 
in Reformed doctrine, people are unable to save themselves, so they cannot 
be saved by “faith alone” if this faith is seen, directly or indirectly, as a human 
instrument to ensure salvation in the context of theology, science, philosophy, 
language, emotion, piety or any other human capacity. Reason (Descartes) 
and faith alone (Luther) led modernism to false, foundational certainties (see 
Du Toit 2006:208). These certainties have been eroded by postmodernism 
and post-foundationalism.  
But Barth, too, broke them down. Just as theological modernism had 
reached a certain prominence, Barth proclaimed the “impossibility” of 
theological thought and put an end to theology as an independent science 
(alongside but not subject to the Word). In a typically dialectical way, Barth – 
with qualifications – restored to theology the ability to know which he had 
denied it. Even natural theology was restored! Barth speaks of the natural 
theology and natural revelation deduced by the church fathers from the 
relative “viewability” and conceivability of God that are granted to mankind. He 
permits natural revelation, provided it is not regarded as a human capability. 
 
This revelation [the natural revelation and natural theology of the 
fathers – CWdT] occurs in the sphere of the creation of God, but 
not in the power of the creation as such ... [It is in the dispensation 
of Jesus Christ] that God – sicut mihi es – becomes knowable and 
therefore viewable and conceivable to us. If, in view of these 
creaturely dispensationes, we for our part venture and are 
permitted to venture to speak of God in our human viewings and 
                                                     
19 For this reason Barth states (CD I/1:33) that if faith is to be serious, there “… must be a 
conflict of faith with itself”. He spells this out as a conflict of church-based (or revealed) faith 
with itself: “For at this point, in its opposition to Roman Catholicism and to Protestant 
Modernism, evangelical faith is at conflict with itself” (CD I/1:36). 
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concepts, and therefore to make use of the possibilities given to us 
in our relationship to the creation in general, the legitimacy and 
strength of this use does not originate from a revelation proceeding 
from the creation, but from a revelation entering into the creation 
and illuminating it. The fact that the one revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ actually does illuminate the creation and our relationship to it, 
and therefore also our human possibilities of viewing and 
conceiving, means that we are given the authorisation and 




The created dispensation includes all human capabilities and means, from 
reason to language, science and therefore also natural theology as it is 
understood through the natural sciences. The qualification which Barth insists 
on is that these capabilities should not be regarded as human achievements, 
but as knowledge and understanding coming from God: “... our viewing and 
conceiving remain absolutely behind God as their object and behind faith, 
which is, from our side, the power of their movement. Therefore our 
knowledge reaches its goal only in God himself and in faith” (CD II/1:201).  
The question is whether in our post-Barthian time postmodernism20 and 
post-foundationalism did not achieve the same in the secular sphere! The 
security of knowing, the absoluteness and unity of knowledge, Archimedes’s 
fixed point of objectivity, the fundamental security which modernism brought 
have all been taken away again. The difference must surely be that whereas 
Barth restored believers’ security and firm knowledge of faith and Divine 
revelation “from above”, postmodernism and post-foundationalism did not – 
and did not want to, since their objective was not the church and theology or a 
soteriology, but human knowledge systems. 
 
7. THE SACRAMENTAL DIMENSION OF DOCTRINE 
ELEVATES IT ABOVE NORMAL RATIONALITY 
(NATURAL THEOLOGY)   
In Christ, God is genuinely present on earth without loss of his divinity, 
because the person of Christ is not anchored in his humanity (anhypostatos) 
                                                     
20 There are of course many similarities between Barth’s theology as a reaction to modernism 
and postmodernism’s reaction to modernism. For a similarity between Barth and Derrida, see 
Green (1999:91-108). Barth explains knowledge of God by using an image of concealment 
and revelation. For Derrida, difference functions as an alternative to presence (objectivity and 
accessibility). In the context of difference, the sign functions as a trace which moves meaning 
dynamically from trace to trace in a dialectic of revelation and concealment. Barth and Derrida 
both make use of “the same double nature of language” (Graham Ward, quoted in Green 
1999:97). As in the comparison with Heidegger, this is not to say that there are not 
differences as well.  
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but has its substance in the Logos (enhypostatos). This metaphysical 
construct legitimises knowledge of God, human language and even natural 
theology, provided they are rooted enhypostatically in the Logos. The same 
applies to human thought, the human person, human understanding of the 
world and even natural theology (!), if they are anchored in the Logos. Just as 
faith changes bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ (though not 
physically observable) in the eucharist, so the human person, human 
rationality, language and insight change when they acquire a sacramental 
dimension through the revelatory Word of God.21 This enables Barth to say 
(CD II/1:110): 
 
The place in which revelation takes place becomes ... objectively 
another place by now becoming the place of revelation. Man in the 
cosmos, who is confronted with God’s revelation ... becomes, as 
man confronted by God’s revelation, objectively another man ... But 
this otherness of man is – always in the first place quite objectively 
– his truth, his unveiled reality: the truth and reality also of his 
cosmos. 
 
Outside the “place” of the revelatory Word, human truth is falsehood, human 
knowledge is veiled in darkness, and the human cosmos is nothing but natural 
theology. Barth provides a further example of this in his explication of Psalm 
36:9 (“With thee is the fountain of life: in thy light shall we see light”) when he 
says that Israel, like its neighbours, looked to the stars and natural 
phenomena like storms in order to make statements about God. The 
difference is that insofar as Israel’s statements were made “under the 
revelatory word”, they obtained a different meaning. “It is because and as God 
speaks and acts in Israel that man in the cosmos becomes objectively 
another, namely the one who in the whole cosmos encompass of his 
existence can now know and has to acknowledge the might and glory of this 
God” (CD II/1:112). The following passage sums it up: 
 
 
                                                     
21 God reveals himself by concealing himself in cosmic creatureliness in Jesus Christ, who is 
an enigma (Erde) but who also enlightens as an enigma (Welt) (CD II/1:56). Barth himself 
uses the sacrament as a token of revelation: “He unveils Himself as the One He is by veiling 
Himself in a form which He Himself is not. … He uses its work and sign, in order to be 
objective in, with and under this form, and therefore to give Himself to be known. Revelation 
means the giving of signs. We can say quite simply that revelation means sacrament, that is, 
the self-witness of God, the representation of His truth, and therefore of the truth in which He 
knows Himself, in the form of creaturely objectivity” (CD II/1:52). Green, correctly in my view, 
says that “Karl Barth’s theology can thus be accurately described as a semiology, a 
theological semiotics”. 
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We can now see what is involved in this remarkable biblical 
reference to man in the cosmos as such ... By pointing to man in 
the cosmos, they [i.e. biblical references – CWdT] point to a certain 
extent through him to the man of the revelation of God, that is to the 
man who, in the covenant of God with his people, in the unity of the 
members of the body of Christ with their Head, is a participant in ... 
the knowledge of God. They do not consider taking man in the 
cosmos seriously and addressing him in his ‘nature’ – which really 
means in his self-understanding. Rather they say to him that he no 
longer really exists as such; that in his self-understanding he now 
exists only in one monstrous misunderstanding. For his original and 
proper truth has now been opened up to him by God’s revelation. 
They point to ... Jesus of Nazareth, to the judgement fulfilled in Him, 
to the grace which man has found before God in Him. They point to 




Thus we are dealing with an event analogous to the sacramental changing of 
the bread and wine – an event which people readily understand as one in 
which the same object acquires new meaning. This was described by 
Heidegger (1971:15-89) in his essay “The origin of the work of art”. As Erde 
(earth), the work of art is simply a physical, autonomous fact. At the same 
time it is the work of art veiled and concealed. Understanding and internalising 
the work, experiencing the work as an event constitutes its world (Welt). The 
impact of the work comes from the object itself and is not determined by the 
subject. Analogously to Barth’s view that people under the Word find 
themselves in a different place and are altered in their being, Heidegger 
(1971:35) takes the example of Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of shoes: “[Welt] 
comes to the fore only by bringing ourselves before Van Gogh’s painting. This 
painting spoke. In the vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else 
than we usually tend to be.” “The art work opens up in its own way the Being 
of beings. This opening up, i.e. this deconcealing, i.e. the truth of beings, 
happens in the work” (Heidegger 1971:39). In this way our understanding 
becomes ontological, and not merely methodologically determined.22  
To Barth, people under the revelatory word find themselves in a 
different place and see themselves and the cosmos unveiled. Similarly, 
Heidegger sees the change of Erde into Welt as an unveiling action, and sees 
people experiencing every day that reality metaphorically acquires new 
meaning. So the light fades for researchers and scientific investigators, and so 
people appropriate meaning in order to make sense of the world and their own 
                                                     
22 See Du Toit (1984:48). For a detailed discussion of Heidegger’s essay, see pp 43-51. 
  Cornel W du Toit 
HTS 63(4) 2007  1465 
existence. Cognitive scientists explain the process as an outcome of normal 
human brain functions, regardless of the area – religion, aesthetics, science or 
ethics – which gives rise to it. The specific “medium” (be it a metaphor, myth, 
work of art, sermon, film, poem or scientific model) is a matter of chance. On 
the secular level the experience can be interpreted as a sacramental 
dimension – an event which people find holy, moving, insightful, related to 
words and understanding.  
To return to Barth, a good example of how understanding takes place 
can be seen in the account of creation, which Barth treats as a “creational 
work of art” that “opens” in order to reveal, behind the material nature of the 
work (as myth), the world of God’s work. Barth’s contribution in this regard is 
an excellent example that can be used to put an end to futile arguments in the 
science and religion debate. In his typically dialectic way, Barth states that “… 
the history of the covenant of grace with its miracles, and especially the great 
central miracle, is not only undoubtedly historical but also … highly ‘non-
historical’ … it is not a ‘historical’ history … it can be the object only of a ‘non-
historical’, pre-historical description and narration” (CD III/1:79-80); “… the 
biblical history of creation is pure saga … we ought not to be offended 
because they are sagas. We are no less summoned to listen to what the Bible 
has to say in the form of saga than to what it has to say in the form of 
address, doctrine, meditation, law, epigram, epic and lyric” (CD III/1:82-83); 
“the creation stories of the Bible are neither myths nor fairy tales. This is not to 
deny that they are myths, and perhaps in part fairy tale, in the materials of 
which they are constructed …They are not a historical cover for non-historical 
speculation” (CD III/1:84). Discussing myths in more detail, he goes on:  
 
… [myths] demand that they should look through the story … How 
can we understand myth if we ignore this demand and do not try to 
meet it? Myth has always arisen and still arises from the higher 
recognition, divination and poetic understanding of this kind of 
eternal truth. It has always been a worthy alter ego for philosophy 
… [myth] only appears to tell of creation but in reality it speaks of a 
particular view or solution of the enigma of the world; of a 
combination of real or supposed world-elements by which a man or 
an era thinks that they can explain the existence of these elements 
in their cyclical aspects. Never is man more himself and at home in 
his world, never does he have in his own strength a better 
understanding of himself and his world, than as an inventor and 





Some Barthian perspectives on the present science-r eligion debate  
1466  HTS 63(4) 2007 
What Barth says here applies specifically to natural theology, as he refers 
specifically to “man in his own strength”. What does it mean to “look through” 
a myth? In Heidegger’s example, it means to penetrate the art work as Erde 
and to experience how Welt appears from it. On the religious level, it means to 
hear God’s word in human words. When Barth looks through the creation 
myth, he finds a world of creation which he deems to be literally true in a 
theological sense and on which he bases his entire dogmatics. This emerges 
from the following well-known statement: “His creation is the external basis of 
this covenant” (CD III/1:96). In the creation of light, which is effectively 
summoned from the darkness, Barth sees an analogy to the history of chosen 
and rejected people in the Bible (Jacob-Esau, David-Saul, Judas-Apostles) 
(CD III/1:123). In human beings formed in the imago Dei he first sees Christ 
as an image of God in which all humanity participates and where men and 
women reflect the I-Thou relationship between creator and creature in an 
analogia reflectionis, also manifest  in the inter-trinitarian relationship (CD 
II/1:194-206).23  
Barth’s entire theology is based on his way of looking through the 
biblical texts in all their multiplicity of genres as Erde to discover behind them 
the word of God as Welt, which addresses its dynamic appeal to humanity.  
 
8. CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF NATURE (AND A 
POSSIBLE NATURAL THEOLOGY) VIA THE NATURAL 
SCIENCES 
Nature has traditionally been experienced as provident, threatening and 
mysterious, and its religious, romantic and aesthetic dimensions have been 
emphasised. Most people still find these dimensions relevant, while others 
can be added such as nature in its ecologically sensitive mode – especially as 
a source of recreation, knowledge, technological manipulation and benefits to 
humanity – as well as issues of ownership.  
Nowadays, especially in developed countries, the religious and 
aesthetic dimensions of nature are mediated by the natural sciences. We 
never encounter “pure” nature: it always comes in a ready-interpreted form. 
Many people find that this does not interfere with, but intensifies, their 
experience of beauty, admiration and wonder. 
This implies that a reinterpretation of natural theology has become 
essential, not as a new proof of God’s existence but as a necessary 
dimension of the interpretation of faith in order to arrive at intellectual honesty 
in the modern world. 
 
                                                     
23 For a concise discussion of this, and for the ethical dimension of interdisciplinary work and 
the connection between imago Dei and human rights, see Van Huyssteen (2006:111-165). 
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Although many believers manage to keep the modern, scientific 
worldview image in a state of coordinated tension with the biblical worldview, 
others find this unsatisfactory, and in the absence of a public forum for 
discussion, implausible biblical statements are written off as myths without 
any attempt to incorporate them meaningfully into a modern hermeneutic 
system. Not every statement in the Bible is a myth, and not all myths are 
meaningless for the construction of values that could contribute positively to 
contemporary societies. The revision and explication of theological and 
doctrinal rhetoric are prerequisite for meaningful contributions to present-day 
inter- and trans-disciplinary discourse.  
In Barth’s terms, does this mean compromising the exclusivity of the 
divine revelation in Jesus Christ? I do not think so. Barth’s radical view of 
revelation should not prevent us from, where appropriate, complementing and 
even reinterpreting revelation with the aid of physical, biological, ecological, 
health and other dicta from the natural sciences which have become part of 
the modern worldview. Those explanations are in no way meant to compete, 
on a soteriological level, with faith when it comes to the exclusivity of salvific 
events. Appropriating these events does not abrogate believers’ responsibility 
towards the world they live in and the values developed with the aid of insights 
from natural science.  
Many theologians do not suffer from a paranoid fear that theology is 
incapable of functioning as a scientific discipline and are ready to enter into 
dialogue with other sciences about joint and mutual responsibility for our 
world. This does not mean that the scientific voice of theology cannot address 
a prophetic appeal or cannot invoke faith in the course of such dialogue. 
Interested parties from various fields are in fact looking for possible 
contributions of believers from all religions in view of the problems threatening 
the world and its peoples. In his book on the place and role of order in 
theology and natural science, Torrance takes us beyond the dualistic view that 
natural sciences only ask ‘how’ questions and theology only asks ‘why’ 
questions. “That sharp distinction had the effect of importing a deep split 
between science and theology” (Torrance 1985:20). These questions are 
interdependent and inseparable – which does not mean that theology and 
natural science have amalgamated, though it does mean that both sides can 
and should influence each other so that each can make its own distinctive 
contribution. Torrance sees the concept of order as a common denominator 
which unites both disciplines: “The fact that natural and theological science 
both operate under the constraint of an ultimate ground of order, which will not 
allow a divorce of natural order from the order that ought to be, shows us that 
there is only one rational order pervading the entire universe” (Torrance 
1985:21). Barth’s dialectical rhetoric made it possible for him to transgress the 
limitations we impose on an enclosed worldview. In Barth’s view of creation 
Some Barthian perspectives on the present science-r eligion debate  
1468  HTS 63(4) 2007 
“any dualism between immanence and transcendence becomes superficial”, 
confirms Chung (2005:60). 
 
9. CONCLUSION: A NEW NATURAL THEOLOGY?  
Does the debate between natural science and theology result in a new kind of 
natural theology?24 The answer is yes and no. No, in that it does not posit new 
proofs of the existence of God (attempts at that, like certain aspects of the 
anthropic principle and the “natural intelligence” debate, have been criticised); 
and yes in the sense of Barth’s opinion, because it represents something of 
an effort to understand. To most supporters, however, it is not an attempt 
which ignores the Word of God, but rather to look through words in order to 
see more clearly. Looking not only at words but also at physical reality is to 
see how the light that pours out from the cosmos is broken up by the prism of 
the Word to display the many-coloured spectrum of God’s grace. 
Taking Barth seriously does not mean attributing natural theology to a 
bunch of “radical” natural scientists and theologians who “go too far” in their 
interpretation of evolution and other natural scientific findings. The church is 
under threat in the first place from a Christian natural theology which is 
revealing itself in the form of human self-justification, self-preservation and 
self-defence. The real threat is self-assured fundamentalism, self-justifying 
foundationalism and smug, blinkered traditionalism.25 Barth gives natural 
theology a place on the left hand of the Word:26  
 
 
                                                     
24 Natural theology is distinct from a theology of nature. In Barthian terms natural theology, 
being analogia entis, is a theology “from below”, premised on human beings, their empirical 
observation and sciences. A theology of nature, on the other hand, is part of God’s revealed 
word and can therefore be seen as analogia fidei. Peters (2005:2) puts it thus: “Natural 
theology starts with unfaith and finds in nature evidence for the existence of God. Theology of 
Nature, in contrast, starts with faith and interprets the natural world as God’s creation.” In the 
same vein Barbour (1997:100) writes: “A theology of nature ... starts from a religious tradition 
based on religious experience and historical revelation.” Peters (2005:2) distinguishes a 
minimalist theology of nature that adapts to changes in worldview according to prior religious 
commitments from what he calls a maximalist theology of nature, in which God constitutes our 
knowledge of the natural world. I find this distinction (like the one between “from below” and 
“from above”) artificial, for how do I know whether my experience and belief are determined 
exclusively by one or the other?  
 
25 We should bear in mind that Barth described church history, in particular, as natural 
theology. “All refutations apart, natural theology can do so much that we must seriously ask 
whether there is not good reason to present the history of Christian theology and the Church 
in general … as one long history of ‘Christian’ natural theology” (CD II/1: 127-128). 
 
26 There are three witnesses: God, mankind and the cosmos. God, who speaks through his 
Word; mankind’s witness of the power of the Word to strike them and change them, and the 
voice of the cosmos in all the dimensions in which we can understand and interpret it (CD 
II/1:99). 
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In the middle, so to speak, there stands the real prophetic-apostolic 
witness of God’s speaking and acting in the history of Israel and in 
the history of Jesus Christ. But on the right there stands 
independently the reference to the direct confirmation by God 
Himself … [through the] speaking of the Holy Spirit ... Then on the 
left ... there stands independently the reference to man in the 




How do we hear the voice of the cosmos today? I hear the voice of the 
cosmos (natural theology) through a modest attempt to understand what we 
can learn of the world and the cosmos by listening to the evidence of the 
natural sciences (in a science and religion debate); through an obstinate wish 
to interpret those insights in the light of God’s word; through blatant honesty 
about the failure of our theories to prove the existence of God (anthropic 
principle, natural intelligence debate, and proofs of God); through altruistic 
responsibility, as a created co-creator, for the fate of God’s creation 
(ecological responsibility and respect for life); through developments in 
genetic engineering; through self-relativising respect for cultural and religious 
diversity (religious, cultural and human rights); through understanding the 
fragile evolutionary process and the biological and corporeal embodiment of 
our thinking (physical relativising of our epistemologies); and through solidarity 
with the fate of all life-forms on our planet (social and ethical dimensions of 
faith). 
In this approach to natural theology, there is a greater need of 
understanding than of self-justification; an acknowledgement of the 
vulnerability and interdependence of all forms of life on this planet; and an 
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